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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Christopher ..._,o.nn.:,n ....,,~'-'"'"'· appeals from his conviction for injuring jails following 
a court trial. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
1n 2011, Beadz was convicted with possession of methamphetamine and 
sentenced to four years with two years fixed, with the district court retaining jurisdiction. 
(APSI, p.1.) While Beadz waited to be transported to NICI, was housed at the Twin 
Falls County Jail. (10/5-6/2011 Tr., p.49, L.14 - p.50, L.4.) evening, angry at 
having been confined in his for minor rule violations, Beadz forcefully struck his cell 
door's window with his head and shattered the glass. (10/5-6/2011 , p.11, L.2 - p.12, 
L.25; p.17, Ls.21-24.) 
The state charged Beadz with injuring jails. (R., pp.41-42.) the facts were 
essentially undisputed, waived his right to a jury trial, instead electing to have a 
court trial. (10/3/2011 , p.3, L.10 - p.5, L.7.) Following the court trial, the district 
court found Beadz guilty. (10/5-6/2011 Tr., p.70, Ls.2-18.) The district court entered 
judgment of conviction and sentenced Beadz to four and a half years with two and a half 
years fixed, to run concurrent with his original sentence. (R., pp.78-82.) The district 
court, as it had with the previous sentence, retained jurisdiction. (R., p 80.) 
Beadz timely appealed from the judgment otthe district court (R., p.89.) 
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ISSUES 
Beadz states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Was Mr. Beadz deprived of his constitutional right to a jury trial 
when the district court held a court trial in the absence of a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary waiver of that right? 
2. Was the evidence sufficient to support Mr. Beadz's conviction on 
the charge of injury to a jail where the State failed to prove that he 
intended to cause damage to the jail? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Beadz failed to establish fundamental error in the district court allowing him 
to waive his right to a jury trial in favor of a court trial? 
2. Was there substantial competent evidence admitted at trial from which the trier of 
fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Beadz was guilty of injuring jails? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Beadz Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error In The District Court's Acceptance 
Of His Waiver Of The Right To A Jury Trial 
A. Introduction 
For the first time on appeal, Beadz argues that he was deprived of his right to a 
jury trial when he instead requested a court trial. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-6.) Beadz 
tacitly acknowledges that he waived his right to a jury trial, but asserts that his waiver 
was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because the district court did not discuss at 
length the differences between court and jury trials with Beadz before accepting his 
waiver. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-15.) Beadz did not raise this issue to the district court 
below and he has failed to establish fundamental error entitling him to relief. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Generally, issues not raised to the district court may not be considered for the 
first time on appeal. State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192,195,824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992). An 
unpreserved issue may only be considered on appeal if it "constitutes fundamental 
error." State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 (Ct. App. 2010). 
C. Beadz Has Failed To Show That The Lack Of An Extensive Colloquy Regarding 
His Right To A Jury Trial Made His Waiver Of That Right Invalid 
The right to a trial by jury is enshrined in the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and in Article I, § 7 of the Idaho State Constitution. The Idaho 
Constitution also provides that "[a] trial by jury may be waived in all criminal cases, by 
the consent of the parties, expressed in open court .... " Idaho Const. Art. I, § 7. in this 
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case, pursuant to the consent of all the parties, Beadz waived his right to trial by jury 
and instead elected to have a court trial. (10/3/2011 Tr., p.3, L.10 - p.5, L.7.) 
Now, for the first time on appeal, Beadz "asserts that the absence of any 
meaningful discussion of the features of a jury trial and the differences between a court 
and a jury trial, along with the absence of the written waiver required under Idaho 
Criminal Rule 23(a), let alone one containing a description of the significance of the 
right, renders his waiver constitutionally invalid." (Appellant's brief, p.13.) Beadz did not 
raise this claim to the district court, so he must establish fundamental error. Johnson, 
149 Idaho at 265, 233 P.3d at 196. In order to establish fundamental error, Beadz must 
meet the standard articulated by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 
209,245 P.3d 961 (2010), wherein 
the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the 
alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived 
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as 
to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not 
harmless. 
kl at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. Beadz has not met this burden. 
Any effort to establish fundamental error is doomed to failure because the 
extensive colloquy sought by Beadz on appeal is not constitutionally required to show 
that a waiver of a jury trial is valid. While Idaho Criminal Rule 23(a) does require that 
such waivers be made in writing, that entitlement is merely based on a Court rule and is 
not constitutional. In fact, as acknowledged by Beadz on appeal, the Court of Appeals 
has previously held that an argument that a defendant's "informed waiver of [the right to 
jury by trial] was verbal rather than in writing . . . does not present a question of 
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fundamental error." State v. Campbell, 131 Idaho 568, 569, 961 P.2d 659, 660 (Ct. 
App. 1998). As noted above, to waive a jury trial, the Idaho Constitution only requires 
the "consent of all parties, expressed in open court." Idaho Const. Art. I, § 7. The 
district court fully complied with this requirement when allowing Beadz to waive his right 
to a jury trial. (See 10/3/2011 Tr., p.3, L.10 - p.5, L.7.) 
Furthermore, the error asserted by Beadz is not clear on the record. As the 
Court of Appeals has explained, "the second element of the Perry test for fundamental 
error, requiring the error plainly exist, necessitates a showing by the appellant that 
existing authorities have unequivocally resolved the issue in the appellant's favor." 
State v. Hadden, 152 Idaho 371, 375, 271 P.3d 1227, 1231 (Ct. App. 2012) (emphasis 
original). Because no Idaho appellate court has ever required the colloquy Beadz 
requests, the law is at best unsettled and the error he asserts is not clear. See kl 
Beadz argument that his waiver was uninformed because the district court did 
not present a lengthy colloquy in relation to that waiver is also not clear from the record. 
Beadz, through counsel, requested that "a jury be waived in this case and this tried to 
the court." (10/3/2011 Tr., p.3, Ls.10-16.) Defense counsel discussed the tactical 
reasons for wajving the jury trial with Beadz, and Beadz "indicated he was okay with the 
court handling the trial rather than the jury." (10/3/2011 Tr., p.3, Ls.21-24.) The trial 
court independently verified that Beadz understood that he was waiving his right to try 
his case before a jury, asking "do you understand that you have the right to have a jury 
decide this case? What your counsel is telling me is that you want to waive that jury 
trial and let myself become the jury ln effect. Is that what you want to do?" (10/3/2011 
Tr., p.5, Ls.2-6.) Beadz responded in the affirmative: "Yes, sir." (10/3/2011 Tr., p.5, 
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L.7.) Nothing in the exchange indicates that Beadz was anything other than aware that 
was waiving his right to be tried by a jury rather than by the judge. 
Beadz waived his right to a jury trial, electing instead to receive a court trial. 
Beadz received a full and fair court trial. There is no indication in the record that 
Beadz's waiver of his right to be tried by a jury was uninformed. Beadz has failed to 
show fundamental error entitling him to relief. 
I!. 
Beadz's Verdict For Injuring Jails Is Supported By Substantial Competent Evidence 
A. Introduction 
After the court trial, the district court found that Beadz had committed all of the 
illegal acts with the requisite mental state for him to be guilty of injuring jails. (10/5-
6/2011 Tr., p.66, L.6 - p.67, L.18; p.70, Ls.2-18.) On appeal, Beadz argues that the 
evidence was insufficient for the judge to find him guilty because, he alleges, the 
prosecutor failed to prove that he intended the injury he caused to the jail. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.15-22.) Beadz's claim fails. A review of the record shows that the court's 
verdict was supported by substantial competent evidence. 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction where there is 
substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonabie doubt. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 
712, 215 P.3d 414, 432 (2009); State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 
(Ct. App. 1997). In conducting this review, the appellate court will not substitute its view 
for that of the finder of fact as to the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to 
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the testimony, or the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Severson, 
147 Idaho at 712, 215 P.3d at 432; Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607. Rather 
the facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, must be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the verdict. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 286, 77 P.3d 956, 975 
(2003); Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607. "Accordingly, substantial evidence 
may exist even when the evidence presented is solely circumstantial or when there is 
conflicting evidence." Severson, 147 Idaho at 712, 215 P.3d at 432 (citing State v. 
Stevens, 93 Idaho 48, 50-51, 454 P.2d 945, 947-48 (1969); State v. Stefani, 142 Idaho 
698, 704, 132 P.3d 455, 461 (Ct. App. 2005)). 
C. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence From Which The Trier Of Fact 
Concluded That Beadz Willfully And Intentionally Injured The Jail 
To convict Beadz with injuring jails, the state had to present evidence whereby a 
rational trier of fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Beadz "wilfully [sic) 
and intentionally br[oke] down, pull[ed) down or otherwise destroy[ed] or injure[d] any 
public jail or other place of confinement." I.C. § 18-7018. The state presented sufficient 
evidence whereby the trier of fact could find all elements of the charged offense beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
In the Idaho Code, the "word 'wilfully,' [sic] when applied to the intent with which 
an act is done or omitted, implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act or 
make the omission referred to. It does not require any intent to violate law, or to injure 
another, or to acquire any advantage." I.C. § 18-101 (1 ). That Beadz willfully struck his 
head against the glass window of his cell door, causing it to break, is not disputed. 
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(Appellant's brief, p.20.) Beadz only contests whether there was sufficient evidence to 
show that he intended to injure the jail. (Appellant's brief, pp.15-22.) 
Generally, "intent is proven 'if it is shown that the defendant knowingly performed 
the proscribed acts."' State v. Mitchell, 146 Idaho 378, 384, 195 P.3d 737, 743 (2008) 
(quoting State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389,400, 3 P.3d 67, 78 (Ct. App. 2000)). "Intent or 
intention is manifested by the commission of the acts and surrounding circumstances 
connected with the offense." I.C. § 18-115; see also Mitchell, 146 Idaho at 384, 195 
P.3d at 743 (direct evidence is not required to prove intent; it may be shown be 
circumstantial evidence or proven by the defendant's acts); State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 
570, 573, 181 P.3d 496, 499 (Ct. App. 2007) ("Criminal intent can be inferred from the 
commission of acts and the surrounding circumstances.") (citations omitted). 
Ultimately, weighing the evidence before it, the district court found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Beadz intended to injure the jail. (10/5-6/2011 Tr., p.70, Ls.4-6.) 
The district court explained to Beadz: 
You were angry. There's no question about that in my mind. You were 
acting out. There is no question about that in my mind, but the only 
rationale I can come to as to why someone would strike their head against 
the window in the fashion that you did with as much force as you did was 
that you intended to cause some injury. Now maybe you didn't 
contemplate that that window was going to break. I certainly recognize 
your argument that maybe you were simply trying to get Deputy Benson's 
attention, but under the facts of this case, I think the state has satisfied 
their burden so I do enter a judgment of guilt in this case. 
(10/5-6/2011 Tr., p.70, Ls.6-18.) The circumstantial evidence presented by the state 
during the court trial was sufficient for the district judge to properly infer that Beadz's 
had the requisite intent when he committed the offense. 
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Beadz was being housed at the Twin Falls County Jail. (10/5-6/2011 Tr., p.49, 
L.14 - p.50, L.4.) In violation of the ru!es, he placed a towel in front of his cell door's 
window, presumably to get some privacy wr1ile he did calisthenics in his underwear. 
( 10/5-6/2011 Tr., p.9, Ls.5-10.) Consistent with policy, the patrol deputy on duty 
removed the towel. (10/5-6/2011 Tr., p.9, L.13 - p.10, L.5.) Beadz did not appreciate 
that; he exited his cell and cursed at the deputy, then returned to his cell. (10/5-6/2011 
Tr., p.10, Ls.6-14.) The deputy, passing by, locked Beadz's cell door. (10/5-6/2011 Tr., 
p.10, Ls.12-18.) 
Before the deputy was able to inform control to keep the door shut, Beadz 
contacted control and was released from his cell. (10/5-6/2011 Tr., p.11, Ls.2-8.) The 
deputy told Beadz to return to his cell several times, but Beadz refused. (10/5-6/2011 
Tr., p.11, Ls.15-16.) The deputy took Beadz by the bicep and escorted him back to the 
cell, again locking the door. (10/5-6/2011 Tr., p.11, Ls.16-18.) Beadz was angry. 
(10/5-6/2011 Tr., p.11, Ls.22-23.) He told the officer that he wanted to take a shower. 
(10/5-6/2011 Tr., p.12, Ls.2-10; see also State's Ex. 8.) The deputy said he could not. 
(10/5-6/2011 Tr., p.12, Ls.11-13; see also State's Ex. 8.) Beadzdid not like that. (10/5-
6/2011 Tr., p.12, Ls.14-16.) He asked the deputy what he had done wrong. (10/5-
6/2011 Tr., p.12, Ls.17-21; see also State's Ex. 8.) The deputy responded that he failed 
to follow instructions from staff. (Id.) Beadz again asked what he had done wrong. (Id.) 
The deputy walked away. (Id.) Beadz then smashed his head into the window, causing 
it to shatter. (10/5-6/2011 Tr., p.12, Ls.22-25; p.17, Ls.21-24.) The deputy explained at 
trial that the window's glass was pretty thick (10/5-6/2011 Tr., p.25, L.23 - p.26, L.4), so 
it would have taken a lot of force to break it like that. Considering all the circumstantial 
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evidence, it is reasonable to infer, as the district court did, that Beadz intended to cause 
some damage when he slammed his head against that window. 
The state presented sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt all the elements of injuring jails. Beadz's conviction should therefore 
be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Beadz's conviction for 
injuring jails. 
DATED this 28th day of November, 2012. 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 28th day of November, 2012, served a true 
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DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
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Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
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Deputy Attorney General 
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